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Abstract
Gambling is one of the basic economic activities that humans indulge in. An inves-
tigation of gambling activities provides deep insights into the economic actions of
people and sheds lights on the study of econophysics. In this paper we present an
analysis of the distribution of the final odds of the races organized by the Japan
Racing Association. The distribution of the final odds Po(x) indicates a clear power
law Po(x) ∝ 1/x, where x represents the final odds. This power law can be explained
on the basis of the assumption that that every bettor bets his money on the horse
that appears to be the strongest in a race.
Key words: econophysics, the efficient market, scaling
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1 Introduction
Since Pascal proposed the theory of probability, the phenomenon of gambling
have given inspirations to many mathematicians, physicists and economists.
For example, economists have studied gambling activities in order to examine
the market efficiency. If bettors try to maximize their expected rewards, it
would be equivalent for every race and every horse. In this case, the gambling
market is efficient, and there is no assured way to gain money. Gabriel and
Marsden studied market efficiency in British racetrack betting and found this
gambling market to be inefficient[1]. Russo, Gandar and Zuber conducted a
similar study on the National Football League betting market[2]. They found
no clear indication of breakdown of efficiency. These results are re-examined
Cain et al. and Ioannidis and Peel by different methods[3,4]
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Econophysics and financial engineering are other examples of studies that
are closely related to gambling. It is true that gambling and trading differs.
Though the stock value is determined by the action of traders, the bettors
cannot determine the horse who win the race. However, the trading of stocks
bears some similarity to gambling. In trading, traders speculate on stocks,
attempt to predict which stock value will rise in the future. This is similar
to gambling, in which bettors attempt to predict. Especially, the rewards of
winners is determined by the decision of all bettors. This is similar to trading,
in which the stock value is determined by the action of traders. Thus, the
investigation of gambling will contribute to the advancement of econophysics.
In this regards, Park and Domany reported the distribution of odds in Korean
horse races[5]. They found the power-law distribution of the final odds. To
explain this distribution, they proposed the model of betting, in which the
bettors’ estimation of winning probability is affected by the odds.
In this paper, we present an investigation of the distribution of the odds in
horse racing in Japan, where national horse races are organized by the Japan
Racing Association(JRA). The form of betting in horse race in Japan is same
as the one in Korea. There is only one form of betting: pari-mutuel tote bet.
In this betting system, the management expenses are deducted from the to-
tal amount of the bet, and the winners divide the remaining amount among
themselves. In this paper, the odds is defined as the ratio of the reward to the
bet. If we neglect the management expenses, the odds of a horse is given as
total amount of the bed divided by amount of the bed on the horse.
We show that the distribution of the final odds shows power law Po(x) ∝ x
−1,
where x represents the final odds. This is different from the one obtained by
Park and Domany, Po(x) ∝ x
−1.7. We propose the model to account for this
power-law distribution. One interesting point of this model is that this power-
law behavior is obtained by assuming bettors to be irrational. Here the word
‘irrational’ means that bettors do not try to maximize their expected rewards.
If we assume bettors to be rational, i. e. attempt to maximize expected re-
wards, we obtain power-law Po(x) ∝ x
−2, which is different from empirical
data.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we present the
distribution of the final odds in horse races organized by the JRA. We show
that the distribution of the final odds Po(x) and that of winners’ odds Pw(x)
exhibit power-law behaviors, Po(x) ∝ x
−1 and Pw(x) ∝ x
−2. In section 3, we
propose the model to account for this power-law distribution. In section 4, we
make some discussion on our results.
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Fig. 1. Distribution of the final odds between February and July 2005.
2 Investigation of the final odds in racing organized by the JRA
We analyze the data of 1750 races organized by the JRA between February and
July 2005. A total of 24493 horses participated in these races. For simplicity,
we investigate only the odds of the win bets, without considering other bets
such as dual forecasts or place bets.
In Fig.1, we plot the distribution of the final odds Po(x) for each month,
where x represents the final odds. It should be noted that this distribution is
not one of the winning payouts; this figure shows the distribution of the final
odds, including the losers’ odds. The distribution Po(x) for each month is very
similar. At x < 100, Po(x) follows the power-law distribution, Po(x) ∝ x
−γ ,
and decays exponentially at x > 100. In order to obtain a clearer picture of
the power-law distribution, we plot the total half-year distribution in Fig.2.
This data indicates that γ ∼ 1. The distribution of the final winners’ odds is
also interesting. In the same figure, we also plot the half-year distribution of
winners’ odds. This data shows that the distribution of the winning payouts
also follows the power law, Pw(x) ∝ 1/x
2.
It should be noticed that these data appear to be consistent with the efficiency
of the gambling market. We assume that we bet on a horse whose final odds
are represented by x. Then, the probability that the horse win is proportional
to Pw(x)/Po(x). Because the expected reward is represented by xPw(x)/Po(x),
the empirical data shows that Pw(x)/Po(x) is proportional to x and that the
expected reward is independent of x.
However, the efficiency of the gambling market does not mean the rationality
of bettors. If bettors are rational, they will bet on the horse whose expected
rewards is maximum, and the expected rewards will become equivalent for all
horses. It is true that rationality of bettors is a sufficient condition for the
efficient market, however, it is not a necessary condition. It should also be
noted that the power-law distribution of the final odds cannot be explained
solely by the rationality of bettors. We will need some other assumptions to
explain the distribution. In the next section, we propose a model to account
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Fig. 2. Total distribution of the odds and the winners’ odds between February and
July 2005.
for these power-law distributions of the final odds.
3 Model simulation
In this section, we propose a model to account for the distribution of the final
odds. In order to construct the model, we must focus on the following points.
First, the strength of each horse running in a race varies. One horse may be
stronger than the other horses, and the weakest horse may perhaps lose the
race. Therefore, we must include the differences in the strengths of horses
in the model. Second, the strength of each horse provides the probability of
winning. Even the strongest horse can lose the race if he is in poor health.
Therefore, it appears natural to assume that the probability of winning is
given by a function of the strength of the horse. Third, bettors are unaware
of the exact strength of the horses. While they do know that some horses are
stronger than the others, they do not know the exact strength and cannot
precisely estimate the probability of winning.
Considering these points, we propose the following model:
(1) Each horse running in a race has a parameter called ‘strength’ s, 0 < s ≤
1. si, the strength of horse i, is given by a uniform random number between
0 and 1.
(2) Each bettor estimates the strength of horse i as si + ri, where ri is the
Gaussian random number. ri varies for each bettor, and the strength esti-
mated by each bettor also differs.
(3) Each bettor bets his money on the horse that appears to have the max-
imum strength in a race. As observed, bettors do not know the exact
strength of the horses. They place their bets under incorrect estimation
of the strength given by the previous rule. For simplicity, we assume that
every bettor bets the same amount of money.
(4) After each betting, xi, the odds of a horse i, is updated as xi = ntot/ni,
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Fig. 3. Distribution obtained from our model at σ = 0.05, 0.5 and 5.0. Each
distribution is obtained by simulating our model 1000 times.
where ntot and ni represents the total number of bettors and number of
bettors who bets on horse i, respectively. This rule means that we neglect
the management expenses, and the total amount of bets is divided among
the winners. This simplification does not lead to any problems.
(5) The winning probability of a horse is proportional to his strength.
This model has three parameters. The first parameter is the number of horses
that participate in one race. Although the number of horses differs with each
race, in the following simulation, we assume that 14 horses participate in one
race. This approximates the average number of horses participate in one race,
13.996. The second parameter is the number of bettors. We set this number
as 10000. The qualitative result of this simulation does not depend on the
details of this parameter, if it is sufficiently large. The third parameter is σ,
the dispersion of a random number ri. In our model, σ is the only parameter
we should adjust for fitting.
To see the σ-dependence of the distribution of the final odds, we plot the
distribution Po(x) obtained by our model for some typical σ in Fig.3. If σ ≪ 1,
almost all bettors bet on the strongest horse, and Po(x) shows sharp peak at
x = 1. On the other hand, if σ ≫ 1 the strength of horse scarcely affects the
choice of bettors. Every bettor bets on the horse almost at random, and Po
will show sharp peak at x = htot, where htot is the total number of horses. The
results of simulation at σ = 0.05 and σ = 5.0 shown in Fig.3 are consistent
with this qualitative discussion. Though the region where P (x) ∝ 1/x appears
in both cases, these results do not qualitatively coincide with empirical data.
In the following of this paper, we use σ = 0.5 and compare the empirical data
and the result of simulation.
We calculate the distribution of the final odds at σ = 0.5 by simulating this
model 10000 times. The results of the simulation are shown in Figs. 4 and
5. With regard to the distribution of the final odds shown in Fig.4, both the
power-law behavior at x < 100 and the exponential decay at x > 100 are
reproduced well in our model and are represented by squares. On the other
hand, the power-law behavior of the distribution of the winners’ odds shown in
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Fig. 4. Comparison of the empirical distribution of the final odds and model calcu-
lation. Circles, squares and crosses represent the empirical data, the result of the
model simulation and the result of the model simulation in which bettors attempt
to maximize their expected rewards, respectively.
Fig.5 is also reproduced by the simulation, although the absolute value differs
slightly. These results suggest the validity of our model.
However, the economists who believe in the rationality of people will expect
that the bettors attempt to maximize their expected returns. If this is true,
the bettors bet their money on the horse whose expected rewards (winning
probability multiplied by odds) is maximum, instead of betting on the one
whose probability of winning is maximum. However, the simulation shows
that the empirical data cannot be accounted for by using the ‘maximize the
expected rewards’ model. In the ‘maximize the expected rewards’ model, we
use the following rule instead of the rule (3) in our model:
(3’) Each bettor bets his money on the horse that appears to have the maxi-
mum expected rewards in a race. Because the probability that a horse wins
is proportional to his strength, the expected reward of horse i seems pro-
portional to (ntot+1)(si+ ri)/(ni+1). Bettors bets his money on the horse
i that seems to have maximum expected reward.
Here we note that the expected rewards is not ntot(si + ri)/ni, because if
the bettor bets on the horse i, the odds of the horse changes from ntot/ni to
(ntot+1)/(ni+1). In this model, the distribution of the odds is not δ-function
even if ri = 0, because bettors bet on the weak horse with high odds. If the
number of bettors is large enough, the expected rewards xisi will be same for
all horses. The result of the simulation based on this model is indicated by the
cross in Figs. 4 and 5. In this ‘maximize the expected rewards’ calculation,
we take σ = 0.001. In this model, the distribution of the final odds Po(x)
and winners’ odds Pw(x) are approximately proportional to 1/x
2 and 1/x3,
respectively. These results are inconsistent with the empirical data.
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Fig. 5. Comparison between the empirical distribution of the winners’ odds and
model calculation. Circles, squares and crosses represent the empirical data, the
result of the model simulation, and the result of the model simulation in which
bettors attempt to maximize their expected rewards, respectively.
4 Conclusion and Discussion
We investigate the distribution of the final odds in horse races organized by the
JRA. The distribution of the final odds shows the clear power-law Po(x) ∝ x
−1
at x < 100. The distribution of the winners’ odds also shows a power-law
behavior, Pw(x) ∝ x
−2. In order to explain these distributions, we propose
a model for the action of bettors. Numerical simulation of this model shows
good agreement with the observation.
These results show that the actions of the bettors in gambling can be de-
scribed by our simple model. In particular, it should be noted that our model
does not consider the bettors to be rational. In economics, a rational person
will attempt to maximize his expected rewards and bet on the horse whose
expected rewards appear to be maximum. In the usual model of the efficient
market, the efficiency is guaranteed by this rationality. On the other hand, in
our model bettors bet on the horse whose winning probability is maximum.
Bettors do not bet on the weak horse, even if the odds are extremely high. Of
course, we may be able to make the model to explain the distribution of odds,
assuming rational bettors. For example, the different distribution of strength
of horses si will give the different distribution of the final odds. However, such
a model will be more complicated one than our model. Therefore it seems
natural to conclude that bettors are irrational in horse-racing.
The inconsistency between our investigation and that of Park et al.[5] is also
interesting. They studied the odds in Korean horse races and found the power-
law distribution of the final odds, Po(x) ∝ x
−1.7. To explain this power-law
distribution, the assumed that bettors overestimate the probability of winning
of the horse whose odds is small. Due to this effect, bettors overestimate the
winning probability of strong horse. Both of their empirical data and simula-
tion model are different from ours. In Japanese horse races, the distribution
of odds shows different power-law, Po(x) ∝ x
−1. One of the possible origin of
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this difference is the difference in the distribution of the strength of horse. As
we noticed, the different distribution of the strength of horses will give the dif-
ferent distribution of the final odds. However, it will be difficult to obtain the
distribution of the strength from empirical data. We also note that the model
of Parks et al. cannot explain our empirical data even if the distribution of
strength is changed. As noticed above, their model assumes that the winning
probabilities of strong horses are overestimated. If it is true, we can obtain
larger expected rewards when we bet on the horse with large odds. However,
our data show that the expected rewards is almost independent from odds.
Our paper will shed light on the understanding of other economic activities
of people, such as those in the financial market. The dynamics of the finan-
cial market is one of the main concern in econophysics. In this regards, the
understanding of the action of traders plays the crucial role. If we know the
action of each trader, we can make a reliable model to emulate the market.
In this paper, we construct a model of bettors in gambling market, which can
explain the distribution of the final odds very well. The knowledge obtained
from the study of gambling market will give important information to the
understanding of the financial market.
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